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THE CRISIS IN HOUSING AND HOUSING
FINANCE: WHAT CAUSED IT? WHAT
DIDN'T? WHAT'S NEXT?
ELLEN HARNICK*

INTRODucnON

The current economic crisis has escalated with surprising
speed, and its impacts are so well known that they need hardly be
recounted. No sector of American economic life has been left unaf
fected, and matters are expected to get worse. At the heart of the
crisis lies the fundamental problem that too many homeowners
have mortgages that are unsustainable.
The problem is not simply that people borrowed more than
they could repay, but that loans were structured in a way that was
inherently unstable. Outside the market for prime mortgages, the
loans most frequently peddled required repeated and costly refi
nancing that was only possible while home prices continued rising.
The same loan balances held in traditional thirty-year fixed-rate
loans, or more traditionally structured adjustable-rate mortgages,
would not have produced foreclosures on the scale now occurring.
Moreover, the crisis has been permitted to continue for so long
that even homeowners who received soundly structured prime
mortgages face heightened foreclosure risk because tight credit con
ditions and stalled housing markets have made it unusually difficult
to sell, refinance, or obtain home equity credit. Unless distressed
homeowners can restructure their mortgage payments, over eight
million of them-one out of every six homeowners with a mort
* Ellen Harnick is Senior Policy Counsel at the Center for Responsible Lending
(CRL), a nonprofit, nonpartisan research and policy organization dedicated to protect
ing homeowners hip and family wealth by working to eliminate abusive financial prac
tices. CRL is affiliated with Self-Help, one of the nation's largest community
development financial institutions. This Article was given as part of the Annual Con
ference on Entrepreneurship in a Global Economy at the Western New England Col
lege Law and Business Center for Advancing Entrepreneurship on October 17, 200S.
Thanks and acknowledgment are due to several of my colleagues at CRL, especially
Eric Stein, Kathleen Keest, and Sam Rogers. Some of the information contained in this
Article has been adapted from CRL Congressional testimony. The views expressed,
and any errors or shortcomings, are mine alone.
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gage-are forecasted to end up in foreclosure over the next five
years.1
These eight million families will be harmed for sure, but the
pain will extend far beyond them. Foreclosures negatively affect
whole neighborhoods, and the freefall in the housing sector strains
the broader economy, as approximately one out of eight U.S. jobs is
directly or indirectly related to housing.2 Effective measures are
urgently needed to help existing homeowners stay in their homes if
they can afford to sustain a market-rate mortgage for the value of
the home. As taxpayers are called upon to rescue the leaders of the
American capital markets, it seems sensible to attempt a clear un
derstanding of what went wrong so that the costly lessons can be
properly learned. 3
I.

A.

How WE GOT HERE

Market Structure and Incentives

The beginning of the twenty-first century saw the rise of a new
kind of mortgage lender-mortgage "bankers" that are not actual
banks. These companies raise the funds they lend, not through
bank deposits, but by borrowing money from investment banks or
commercial banks, and repaying that money by selling to investors
the right to share in the proceeds of the mortgage payments re
ceived from borrowers. This process, known as "securitization,"
has disrupted the traditional alignment of interests that formerly
existed between borrower and lender. 4
l. ROD DUBITSKY ET AL., CREDIT SUISSE, FORECLOSURE UPDATE: OVER 8 MIL·
LION FORECLOSURES EXPECTED 1, 3 (2008), http://www.chapa.org/pdf/Foreclosure
UpdateCreditSuisse.pdf (forecasting that 8.1 million foreclosures will occur over the
next four years, corresponding to sixteen percent, or more than one out of seven homes
with a mortgage, and further predicting that if the economic recession becomes more
severe than forecasted, projected foreclosures will increase to 10.2 million, or one out of
five homes with a mortgage).
2. Stevenson Jacobs, For Bailout to Work, Housing Market Needs to Mend, USA
TODAY.COM, Oct. 5, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2oo8-1O
04-bailout-housing..N.htm ("Housing is a critical component to the U.S. economy and
by extension the availability of credit. Roughly one in eight U.S. jobs depends on hous
ing directly or indirectly-from construction workers to bank loan officers to big bro
kers on Wall Street.").
3. For an excellent summary of the current fiscal crisis, see CONGo OVERSIGHT
PANEL, SPECIAL REpORT ON REGULATORY REFORM-MODERNIZING THE AMERICAN
FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING OVERSIGHT,
PROTECTING CONSUMERS, AND ENSURING STABILITY (2009), http://cop.senate.gov/
documents/cop-012909-report-regulatoryreform.pdf.
4. See generally Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A McCoy, Turning a Blind
Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 2083 (2007);
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A generation ago, the lender held onto a mortgage loan until it
was repaid, and so retained a relationship with the borrower and an
interest in her financial wellbeing. In contrast, when loans are
securitized, the lender has no long-term stake in the outcome. Most
subprime loans of recent years were originated by a mortgage bro
ker and remained on the books of the lender only long enough to
be pooled with other loans and sold to investors. The originating
lender and broker had no stake in the borrower's success or failure
thereafter. Not surprisingly, the process has produced a surge in
loans with elevated default risk-risks that were known to the bro
ker and lender at the time the loan was originated.
Compounding the danger, market incentives motivated loan
originators to make loans with the riskiest terms available. Inves
tors paid loan originators more for making loans with high-risk fea
tures than they did for standard fixed-rate mortgages with full
documentation of income. Explaining the impact of these incen
tives to the New York Times, the CEO of one such mortgage lender
said: "The market is paying me to do a no-income-verification loan
more than it is paying me to do the full documentation loans ....
What would you do?"5 Even borrowers who provided the lender
with their tax returns and other full documentation of income were
put into "no documentation" loans, often completely unaware, and
they paid higher mortgage rates for the privilege. When asked why
lenders made so many risky loans, the chief economist of the Mort
gage Bankers Association (MBA) replied: "Because investors con
tinued to buy the loans."6
Other market forces had a similarly corrosive effect. The sec
ondary market gave price incentives to lenders and brokers to favor
mortgages structured to require repeated refinances because each
refinancing produced new origination fees and penalty payments.
Similarly, mortgage lenders paid brokers a premium for putting

Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 2185
(2007); ELLEN SCHLOEMER ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, LOSfNG GROUND:
FORECLOSURES IN THE SUBPRIME MARKET AND THEIR COST TO HOMEOWNERS (2006),
available at http://www.responsiblelending.orglmortgage-lendinglresearch-analysisl
forectosure-paper-report-2-17.pdf.
5. Vikas Bajaj & Christine Haughney, More People with Weak Credit Are Default
ing on Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2007, at Cl.
6. Les Christie, Subprime Loans Defaulting Even Before Resets, CNNMONEY.
COM, Feb. 20, 2008, http://money.cnn.coml2008/02/20/real_estate!loans_failing...pre_
resets/index.htm.
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borrowers into higher cost loans than they qualified for? Capping
the array of misdirected incentives, investors have been permitted
to disclaim liability for abuse and illegality in the loan origination
process. As a result, when a loan is sold to investors, an abused
homeowner generally loses the right to raise the abuse as a defense
to foreclosure. 8
The circle of disclaimed responsibility was thus complete
loan originators had little reason to care whether the loans could be
sustained, and investors had little reason to care whether there was
illegality or abuse in the loan origination. Lenders and investors
were poised to profit most from loans whose sustain ability was
least, and they were shielded from the consequences. The result
was exactly as could be expected-borrowers were put into loans
that were far worse than was necessary or advisable.
For many years, this scheme proved highly profitable for lend
ers and investors alike. In this way, securitization facilitated a large
transfer of wealth to lenders, Wall Street, and global investors, from
the most vulnerable segment of the American middle class, who are
now losing their homes to boot. The flood of foreclosures today
goes beyond the typical foreclosures of years past, which were gen
erally precipitated by catastrophic and unforeseen events such as
job loss, divorce, illness, or death. Such factors, of course, continue
to produce foreclosures, and will do so increasingly as job disloca
tions rise with declining economic conditions. But the striking fea
ture of this crisis is that, at its core, it is driven by the very design of
the loans at issue. The loan products at the heart of the crisis were
structured in a way that made widespread failure virtually
inevitable.

B.

The Loan Products at the Heart of the Crisis

For the past five years, the most common loan made in the
sub prime mortgage market was a so-called "hybrid adjustable rate
mortgage," colloquially known as a "2/28" or "3/27" because its in
7. See Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV.
197, 247 (2008).
8. This is the result of the "holder in due course" doctrine, which protects pur
chasers of negotiable instruments who acquire title "for value, ... in good faith, ...
[and] without notice" of any defect. See UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-302, 2A U.L.A.
342 (2004). This is not a hard and fast rule-homeowners who are able to retain good
counsel are sometimes able to overcome the doctrine. But typically the homeowner's
only recourse is to sue the loan originator. Few foreclosed homeowners have the re
sources to pursue this relief, and with many loan originators now in bankruptcy or
closed, homeowners cannot recover in any event.
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terest rate was fixed for two or three years out of a thirty-year term.
The interest rate would increase sharply at the end of the fixed-rate
period, generally without regard to whether interest rates in the
economy stayed flat, or even fell. A typical loan originated in 2006,
for example, would start at the rate of roughly eight percent, and
two years later would rise to ten percent, and, depending upon the
movement of interest rates generally, would continue to rise every
six months up to a cap of roughly thirteen percent. 9 To avoid this
rate increase, a borrower would have to sell or refinance before the
rate reset-and would pay a steep "prepayment penalty," typically
at least three percent of the loan balance, for doing So.lO
Because the typical borrower did not have cash on hand suffi
cient to cover the prepayment penalties and refinancing fees, these
would be paid from the proceeds of the new loan. Accordingly, the
loan balance would grow with each refinancing. Of course, this
stripped away much of the economic benefit of homeownership, but
it was at least possible-and extremely lucrative for brokers, lend
ers, and investors-as long as home prices kept rising. Once home
prices declined, a rise in foreclosures predictably followed.
Tragically, most borrowers who received these loans qualified
for better, more sustainable loans. A study for the Wall Street Jour
nal found that of the subprime loans originated in 2006 that were
packaged into securities and sold to investors, sixty-one percent
"went to people with credit scores high enough to often qualify for
conventional [prime] loans with far better terms."ll And even
those borrowers who did not qualify for prime loans could have
received sustainable, thirty-year fixed-rate loans, for at most fifty to
eighty basis points above the introductory rate on the unsustainable
exploding adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) loans they were
given. 12 This fifty to eighty basis point increase is modest compared
with the three hundred basis point prepayment penalty (plus addi
9. See Illustrations of Consumer Information for Hybrid Adjustable Rate Mort
gage Products, 73 Fed. Reg. 30,997, 30,999 & n.7 (2008).
10. See John Farris & Christopher A. Richardson, The Geography of Subprime
Mortgage Prepayment Penalty Patterns, 15 HOUSING POL'y DEBATE 687, 689 (2004).
11. Rick Brooks & Ruth Simon, Subprime Debacle Traps Even Very Credit
Worthy: As Housing Boomed, Industry Pushed Loans to a Broader Market, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 3, 2007, at AI; see also CONGo OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 3, at 31 n.51
(collecting sources for the proposition that a significant proportion of borrowers who
received high-cost subprime loans qualified for prime-rate loans).
12. See Letter from the Coalition for Fair and Affordable Lending to Mark
Pearce, Deputy Comm'r of Banks, Office of the Comm'r of Banks (Jan. 26, 2007) (on
file with author).
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tional refinancing fees) that the borrower had to pay to refinance
the 2/28 loan before the end of the second year. Thus, even loans
that did not end in foreclosure were far more costly to the borrower
than the more sustainable loans that were available.
It is doubtful that most borrowers fully understood the actual
cost of these loans-the rate increases were expressed as LIBOR
(the London Interbank Offered Rate) plus a margin. It is even
more doubtful that they appreciated the sheer irrationality of ac
cepting these loans, given the other terms for which they qualified,
but were not offered. Mortgage brokers and lenders, however,
were fully aware that most of the borrowers who received these
exploding loans could not sustain them once the rate reset, and that
substantial home equity would be paid over to the lender with each
refinancing. They also were aware that better loan terms were
available. When federal regulators finally proposed in 2007 to re
quire lenders to determine whether borrowers would be able to af
ford their loans once the monthly payments increased, the response
from industry was telling. Rather than embrace this common sense
standard, many industry leaders resisted it.13 In an argument that
13. Countrywide wrote to the Office of Thrift Supervision objecting to this re
quirement except in narrowly limited circumstances. Specifically, Countrywide argued
that this standard should not apply to any loan (such as the subprime 3/27) whose fixed
rate period lasts for three years or more. Additionally, Countrywide said it should not
apply to borrowers (even those with 2/28 loans) who fully document their income and
have equity in the home equal to ten percent or more of the loan balance. It further
claimed that the standard should not apply even to borrowers who received 2/28 loans
and did not document their income, so long as the borrower had equity in the home
equal to at least fifteen percent of the loan. Letter from Mary Jane M. Seebach, Man
aging Dir. for Public Affairs, Countrywide, to Office of Thrift Supervision, U.S. Dep't
of the Treasury (May 7, 2007), available at http://files.ots.treas.gov/comments/Odbce609
691d-456b-9b30-867f922c1b65.pdf.
The American Securitization Forum (ASF) wrote to the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency urging against the imposition of such standards. Letter from George P.
Miller, Executive Dir., Am. Securitization Forum, to Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury (May 7, 2007), available at http://www.american
securitization.comluploadedFiles/ASFSubprimeProposaICommentLetter.pdf.
The Mortgage Bankers Association wrote to the Federal Reserve Board in August
2007, that
Lenders have every incentive to properly underwrite a borrower's ability to
repay a mortgage loan ....
MBA fears that promUlgating rules under this authority to limit or restrict
underwriting standards could have a detrimental and immediate impact on the
cost and availability of residential mortgage credit across all market
sectors....
Requiring that ARMS ... be underwritten to the fully indexed and fully
amortizing rate threatens their availability.
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should have been recognized as an admission of irresponsible lend
ing, Countrywide estimated that almost sixty percent of Country
wide borrowers who received subprime hybrid ARM loans in the
last quarter of 2006 would not have met this standard. 14
II.

WHAT DIDN'T CAUSE THE CRISIS-SCAPEGOATS AND
RED HERRINGS

One thing is certain: the flood of foreclosures was neither
unforeseeable nor unforeseen. Housing finance experts, consumer
advocates, academics, and economists had warned about the impro
prieties in the subprime mortgage market for the past five years. IS
Arguing that misaligned market incentives were rewarding risky
and frequently exploitive lending practices, the Center for Respon
sible Lending,16 and other consumer groups, urged Congress and
federal banking regulators to step in and prohibit the most destruc
tive of the practices then prevalent and growing in popularity, and
to reintroduce the tenets of sound lending. These principles include
establishing a borrower's ability to repay the loan, documenting the
borrower's income, and prohibiting the payment of premiums to
mortgage brokers as a reward for steering borrowers into more ex
pensive loans than those for which they were qualified.
In fact, serious efforts to avert or mitigate the foreclosure crisis
before it escalated were underway at least since 2006, and had they
been implemented, the scale of the current crisis would have been
substantially diminished. Sadly, these efforts were assiduously (and
Letter from John Robbins, Chairman, Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, to Jennifer J. Johnson,
Sec'y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 21 (Aug. 15, 2007) (on file with
author).
The American Bankers Association (ABA) and America's Community Bankers
(ACB) objected to extending this requirement to mortgage loans other than subprime,
which would exclude many of the Alt-A and payment-option ARMs that are failing
today. See Letter from Mark Tenhundfeld, Dir., Office of Regulatory Policy, Am.
Bankers Ass'n, and Robert Davis, Executive Vice President and Managing Director,
Government Relations, America's Community Bankers, to Jennifer J. Johnson, Sec'y,
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Aug. 15, 2007) (on file with author).
14. Letter from Mary Jane M. Seebach, supra note 13, at 6.
15. For full disclosure, I note that these include my employer, the Center for Re
sponsible Lending, which, since 2006, has been warning of a coming foreclosure epi
demic and has urged solutions to mitigate the crisis. See, e.g., ELLEN SCHLOEMER ET
AL., supra note 4, at 15.
16. Center for Responsible Lending, http://www.responsiblelending.org/ (last vis
ited May 15, 2009).
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successfully) opposed by the lending industry, and particularly the
non-bank mortgage lenders at the heart of this calamityP
At first, industry leaders claimed that their lending practices
were sound, and that no foreclosure crisis was coming. As late as
September 2006, a senior spokesman for the MBA testified to the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs that:
"These products [i.e., hybrid adjustable rate mortgages] are being
effectively underwritten and managed today .... Our simple mes
sage is that the mortgage market works and the data demonstrate
that fact."18 When this proved false, industry leaders claimed that
even if there might be a rise in foreclosures, it would not extend
beyond the subprime market, and certainly would not impact the
broader economy. In May 2007, another senior member of the
MBA announced: "As we can clearly see, this is not a macro-eco
nomic event. No seismic financial occurrence is about to over
whelm the U.S. economy."19 When this claim became
demonstrably unsustainable, industry leaders refocused their efforts
toward pushing lawmakers to reject any proposed solution beyond
"encouragement" to lenders to voluntarily modify failing loans,
claiming that voluntary measures would suffice. In January 2008,
the Chairman-elect of the MBA characterized as a "myth" the
claim that "Congress Has Not Done Enough to Address the Sub
17. See, e.g., Growing Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis: Identifying Solutions and
Dispelling Myths: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1l0th Congo (2008) [hereinafter Growing Mort
gage Foreclosure Crisis], (statement of David Kittle, Chairman-Elect, Mortgage Bank
ers Association), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdflKittle080129.pdf;
Straightening Out the Mortgage Mess: How Can We Protect Home Ownership and
Provide Relief to Consumers in Financial Distress: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1l0th Congo 13
(2007) [hereinafter Straightening Out the Mortgage Mess] (statement of Steve Bartlett,
President and CEO, Financial Services Roundtable), available at http://
judiciary.house.govlhearings/printers/llOthl37978.PDF; Calculated Risk: Assessing Non
Traditional Mortgage Products: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Housing and
Transportation and Subcomm. on Economic Policy of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous
ing, and Urban Affairs, 1l0th Congo (2006) [hereinafter Calculated Risk] (statement of
Robert D. Broeksmit, CMB Chairman, Mortgage Bankers Association), available at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/_fileslbroeksmit.pdf; Peter G. Miller, Foreclosures
No Worries, No Vision, OURBRoKER, Sept. 19, 2008, http://www.ourbroker.com/
?p=1879.
18. Calculated Risk, supra note 17 (statement of Robert D. Broeksmit).
19. Miller, supra note 17 (statement of John Robbins, Chairman of the Mortgage
Bankers Association); Press Release, Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, John M. Robbins,
CMB, Chairman of Mortgage Bankers Association Delivers Newsmakers Speech at Na
tional Press Club Today on Need to Protect Consumers' Access to Credit (May 22,
2007), http://www.mortgagebankers.orglNewsandMedialPressCenter/54451.htm.
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prime Crisis. "20 Along similar lines, the President and CEO of the
Financial Services Roundtable testified in September 2007 that:
"[t]he good news is there is good news on the home mortgage
front. ... Chapter 13 [of the Bankruptcy Code] is successful in stop
ping foreclosures in 97% of cases.... I am reminded of the old
adage, 'if it isn't broke, don't fix it. "'21
The spectacular falsity of these claims should undermine indus
try's influence on such matters. Unfortunately, industry talking
points on the causes of the crisis continue to gain traction. Industry
spokespeople have identified three main culprits with whom, they
claim, most of the responsibility resides. If the industry agenda is
successful, legislative and regulatory responses will focus on these
three scapegoats alone, sparing lenders and Wall Street the basic
standard-setting that is so urgently needed. The scapegoats, dis
cussed in turn, are greedy homeowners, the Community Reinvest
ment Act, and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
A.

Homeowners Who Received Unfair and Deceptive Loans

It is now frequently asserted that the housing crisis was caused
by borrowers who took on mortgages when they never should have
owned their homes in the first place. The industry's primary error,
it is said, was in lowering lending standards to enable people to buy
homes beyond their reach. The fault was the excessive folly of ex
tending homeownership to people who could not handle it. The
primary culprits, then-or, at least equally culpable-were the
homeowners who stretched for something they knew or should
have known they could not achieve.
This claim misapprehends the way mortgages have been mar
keted to consumers in the United States. Former Federal Reserve
Board Chairman Alan Greenspan concluded that the demand for
risky, high-cost loans was driven by mortgage brokers and lend
ers-not by borrowers. 22 No doubt there were borrowers who fully
understood what they were getting into, who lied to their broker
and lender, or who exploited the system for the chance of profit.
20. Growing Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis, supra note 17, at 12 (statement of
David Kittle).
21. Straightening Out the Mortgage Mess, supra note 17, at 13 (statement of Steve
Bartlett).
22. See Jon Meacham & Daniel Gross, The Oracle Reveals All (The World Ac
cording to Alan Greenspan), NEWSWEEK, Sept. 24, 2007, at 32, 33.
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But like the supposedly high-living "welfare queen"23 of the Rea
gan era, the stereotype of the reckless or fraudulent borrower helps
to justify a harshness toward the individuals concerned. Yet, it does
not fairly apply to most of the real people and transactions com
monly involved.
Moreover, even the most unsympathetic borrower who re
ceived a 2/28 subprime loan could have received a less costly and
more sustainable thirty-year fixed rate loan.24 Even these borrow
ers were taken advantage of by mortgage brokers and lenders who
were happy to pass the risks onto far-flung investors.
Contrary to the claim that most of the borrowers who received
subprime loans did so to buy homes they could not afford is the fact
that the overwhelming majority of subprime mortgages made from
1998 through 2006 went to borrowers who already owned their own
homes-approximately sixty percent were refinances, and thirty
percent were for families who were moving from one home to an
other. 25 Far from expanding homeownership to people who other
wise could not afford it, subprime lending actually resulted in a net
reduction in homeownership.26
Nor is there merit to the popular claim that distressed home
owners were borrowing aggressively to purchase oversized
"McMansions." Data collected under the Home Mortgage Disclo
sure Act shows that the average subprime loan amount (which in
cludes loans made in high-priced housing markets like California)
was $205,700. 27 As the former Chair of the MBA subsequently ac
knowledged, the loans at issue were "extremely risky" and the lend
ers who made them were frequently more focused on money and
commissions than on their customers' interests. 28 The effort to shift
the blame to borrowers overlooks the more significant market
forces at work.
23. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Republicans and Race, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19,2007, at
A23 ("Reagan repeatedly told the bogus story of the Cadillac-driving welfare queen-a
gross exaggeration of a minor case of welfare fraud.").
24. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
25. See CrR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, SUBPRIME LENDING: A NET DRAIN ON
HOMEOWNERSHIP 3 & 0.4 (2007), http://www.responsiblelending.orglmortgage-lendingl
research-analysislNet-Drain-in-Home-Ownership.pdf.
26. Id. at 3.
27. Based on data collected under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act for loans
made in 2006, the average subprime loan amount for owner-occupied, first lien, single
family homes was $205,700. The median price was $159,000.
28. Kate Berry, Wachovia Alum Has Tips for an Industry Rebound, AM. BANKER,
Sept. 15, 2008, at 10.
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The Community Reinvestment Act

The second scapegoat is the Community Reinvestment Act
(CRA),29 claimed to have produced the crisis by allegedly forcing
lenders to make risky loans to low- and moderate-income families
and in communities of color. This is not even a colorable claim.
Most subprime lending was done by entities that are not covered by
the CRA.
The subprime lending at the heart of the crisis was done pri
marily by non-bank lenders, which are not subject to CRA require
ments. 30 In fact, a 2008 study revealed that "banks subject to CRA
and their affiliates originated or purchased only six percent of the
reported high cost loans made to lower-income borrowers within
their CRA assessment areas."31 In any event, the CRA was passed
in 1977, and was in effect for more than two decades before sub
prime lending appeared. 32 It had no role in creating the current
cnSlS.

29. Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 1147
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.c. §§ 2901-2908 (2006».
30. Approximately eighty percent of subprime loans were made by players not
covered under CRA. See The Community Reinvestment Act: Thirty Years of Accom
plishments, but Challenges Remain: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services,
110th Congo 38 (2008) (statement of Michael Barr, Professor of Law, University of
Michigan Law School), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-binlgetdoc.cgi?
dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:41181.pdf at 38 [hereinafter Hearing on the
Community Reinvestment Act] ("More than half of subprime loans were made by inde
pendent mortgage companies, another 30 percent by affiliates of banks or thrifts, and
the remaining 20 percent were made by banks and thrifts [covered by CRA].").
31. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Comptroller Dugan
Says CRA Not Responsible for Subprime Lending Abuses (Nov. 19, 2008), http://
www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2008-136.htm. Indeed, the CRA seems to have had the
opposite impact that its critics claim. A recent study found that CRA-covered banks
were less likely than other lenders to make risky, high-cost loans, and were more likely
to retain originated loans in their portfolio than to sell them to investors. See TRAIGER
& HINCKLEY LLP, THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT: A WELCOME ANOMALY IN
THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS-INDICATIONS THAT THE CRA DETERRED IRRESPONSIBLE
LENDING IN THE 15 MOST POPULOUS U.S. METROPOLITAN AREAS 3, 8 (2008), http://
www.traigerlaw.com/publications/traigechinckley_llp_cra_foreclosure_study_1-7 -08.
pdf.
32. For further discussions of how CRA has aided rather than harmed communi
ties, see Hearing on the Community Reinvestment Act, supra note 26, app. at 150 (state
ment of Ann Jaedicke, Deputy Comptroller for Compliancy Policy, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency) (noting that "over half of subprime mortgages of the last
several years-and the ones with the most questionable underwriting standards-were
originated through mortgage brokers for securitization by nonbanks, including major
investment banks"); MICHAEL S. BARR, BROOKINGS INST., CREDIT WHERE IT COUNTS:
MAINTAINING A STRONG COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT 2 (2005), http://www.
brookings.edul-lmediaIFiles/rclreports/200S/OSmetropolitanpolicy_barr/200S0S03_era.
pdf ("Encouraged by the law, banks and thrifts have developed expertise in serving
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Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

The third scapegoat is, collectively, the Federal National Mort
gage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mort
gage Corporation (Freddie Mac), the government-sponsored
mortgage entities (GSEs). Many in industry and government have
claimed that the primary culprits were not private industry, but the
GSEs. The basis of the argument is the decision of the GSEs to
purchase subprime securities from the Wall Street firms that securi
tized subprime loans, and to follow Wall Street into purchasing so
called "Alt-A" loans, which fall between the categories of prime
and subprime. According to this claim, there is no need to further
regulate the Wall Street firms. Instead, it is necessary to regulate
only Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, long resented by many on Wall
Street because of the competitive benefits they enjoy by virtue of
their presumed government backing.33 The claim is further made
that the GSEs' movement into these risky purchases was caused by
the "affordable housing goals" imposed on them by Congress. 34
These claims are similarly unsustainable. While Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac should be strongly criticized for purchasing sub
prime mortgage-backed securities, their role in purchasing and
securitizing problem loans was small in comparison to that of pri
vate industry. All subprime mortgage-backed securities were created
by Wall Street. 35 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac did not securitize
any of these loans because the loans did not meet their standards. 36
low-income communities."); Janet L. Yellen, President and CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of
S.F., Opening Remarks to the 2008 National Interagency Community Reinvestment
Conference, (Mar. 31, 2008), http://www.frbsf.orglnews/speeches/2008/033I.pdf (noting
that "studies have shown that the CRA has increased the volume of responsible lending
to low- and moderate-income households").
33. See, e.g., Laura Mandaro, Behind Anti-GSE Sentiment, Some Simple Math,
AM. BANKER, Mar. 30, 2001, at 1 ("Bankers and trade groups say their business is
squeezed by the lower cost the agencies pay for capital.").
34. See PETER J. WALLISON & CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS, AM. ENTER. INST. FOR
PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, THE LAST TRILLION-DoLLAR COMMITMENT: THE DESTRUC·
TION OF FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC 1, 8 (2008), http://www.aei.orgldocLib/
2oo80930_Binder1.pdf.
35. See, e.g., Kevin Conner, NAT'L TRAINING & INFO. CTR. ET AL., WALL STREET
AND THE MAKING OF THE SUBPRIME DISASTER: How INVESTMENT BANKS FUELED THE
SUBPRIME BOOM, MADE BILLIONS, AND CAUSED THE CURRENT FORECLOSURE CRISIS
(2007), http://www.northwestbronx.orglwallstreet_subprime.pdf; Michael Hudson, Debt

Bomb-Lending a Hand: How Wall Street Stoked the Mortgage Meltdown-Lehman
and Others Transformed the Market for Riskiest Borrowers, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2007,
at AI.

36. See Aaron Pressman, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Were Victims, Not Cul
prits, BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 26, 2008, http://www.businessweek.comlinvestinglinsights!
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While Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchased subprime mort
gage-backed securities that Wall Street created, they were relative
latecomers to a market that had been created by private sector
firms. The government-sponsored entities did not create a market
for unsellable securities. Rather, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac pur
chased the least risky, most sellable tranches of these securities.37
Had the GSEs not bought them, numerous other investors would
have been eager to do so.
The source of both entities' losses, and the reason that they are
no longer independent, are not these subprime loans to low-wealth
borrowers. Rather, the fault lies with the so-called "Alt-A" loans
that they purchased, which were made to relatively wealthy borrow
ers, without adequate documentation of income and savings. 38 Fan
nie Mae and Freddie Mac should be criticized for supporting these
loans, but as with subprime loans, the GSEs followed Wall Street
into this market.39
blog/archives/2ooS/09/fannie_mae_and.html; see also ADAM B. ASHCRAFT & TIL
SCHUERMANN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIZATION
OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CREDIT (200S), http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/stafC
reports/sr31S.pdf.
37. TIMOTHY P. FLYNN & PAUL A. RESTUCCIA, HOUSE COMM. ON THE BUDGET,
ROOTS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT POLICY 6 (2009), http://
www.house.gov!budgecrepublicans/press/2007/pr2009010Srootcauses.pdf. These secur
ities are divided into tranches, with the AAA tranches being the least risky, and for this
reason the easiest to sell to investors. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchased only
AAA tranches. The harder securities to sell are those from the subordinate tranches.
These were made palatable to investors through the creation of collateralized debt obli
gations, which repackaged BBB tranches into, in part, a new set of AAA tranches,
which helped to further market the securities. It is the author'S understanding that the
GSEs did not invest in collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). It was the ability to
fund the riskiest portion of subprime mortgage loans that made possible the explosive
growth of subprime lending. See PERSHING SQUARE CAPITAL MGMT., L.P., WHO'S
HOLDING THE BAG (2007), http://www.designs.valueinvestorinsight.com!bonus/pdfl
IraSohnFinal.pdf.
3S. See FANNIE MAE, FANNIE MAE 200S Q2 lO-Q INVESTOR SUMMARY 36
(200S), http://www.fanniemae.com/media/pdf/newsreleases/200S_Q2_1 OQ_In vestor_
Summary.pdf. By the middle of 200S, AIt-A loans accounted for roughly eleven per
cent of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's risk exposure, but almost fifty percent of their
combined losses. See FED. HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORP., U.S. SEC. & ExCH.
COMM'N, FORM lO-Q: QUARTERLY REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(0) OF
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934-FOR THE QUARTERLY PERIO~ ENDED
JUNE 30, 200S, at 70-71, http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/datal1026214/00010262140S
000026/f5S905elOvq.htm; FED. NAT'L MORTGAGE ASS'N, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
FORM lO-Q: QUARTERLY REpORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(0) OF THE SECURI.
TIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934-FOR THE QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDED JUNE 30, 2OOS,
at 6, http://www.fanniemae.com/ir/pdfleamingsl2ooS/q2200S.pdf.
39. See Charles Duhigg, Pressured to Take More Risk, Fannie Reached Tipping
Point, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 200S, at A1 (noting that in 2004, Angelo Mozilo, then chief
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Nor can it be claimed that pressure to meet affordable housing
goals drove the entities to invest in Alt-A mortgages. Because of
the income characteristics of Alt-A borrowers, the entities' invest
ment in these loans would have actually diluted their affordable
housing ratios. Other pressures-to boost shareholder returns and
keep up with industry-drove the decision. While the entities did
seem to be eligible for affordable housing credit for their purchase
of subprime securities, it seems likely that these other pressures
were similarly responsible for this result as well.
Therefore, there is no merit to the claim that it was Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac, rather than Wall Street, which drove the irrespon
sible practices that produced the crisis. The entities can be fairly
criticized for purchasing the subprime mortgage-backed securities
created by industry and for purchasing "no doc" Alt-A loans.
However, these criticisms are more aptly applied to the investment
banks and private investors who enabled, drove, and deepened the
crisis.
III.

GETTING BACK ON TRACK

The economic crisis began with the foreclosure epidemic, and
addressing the epidemic remains an essential part of our economic
recovery. This requires that loan servicers-the companies that
manage the loans for the investor pools-modify distressed loans to
render them sustainable in those instances where the homeowner
can afford a market-rate loan. This generally will entail reducing
the interest rate to current market levels and writing down the prin
cipal balance to the current value of the home. Servicers are reluc
tant to reduce loan balances, and some popular sentiment views
such a reduction as an undeserved gift. However, without this, the
steady stream of foreclosures will not abate.
Despite broad bipartisan support for the view that loan modifi
cations are essential to stemming the tide of foreclosures, and not
withstanding a series of government-led efforts over the last two
years to encourage servicers to meaningfully modify failing loans,
servicers have failed to modify more than a small percentage of fail-

executive at Countrywide, reportedly demanded that Fannie Mae buy the lender's risk
ier loans or be shut out of the market for its less risky loans).
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ing mortgages. 40 This failure is largely attributable to several signif
icant structural problems. 41
First is the fear of investor lawsuits. Loan modifications will
have different impacts on different classes of investors, and ser
vicers will worry about being sued by someone no matter what type
of modification the servicer chose. 42 Additionally, the servicers
may be limited by the so-called "Pooling and Servicing Agree
ments," which govern the servicers' rights and obligations with re
spect to the investors to provide adequate authority to modify
loans. Some limit the types of modifications servicers can make,
and some limit the number or percentage of loans that can be
modified. 43
Second, between one-third and one-half of the homes pur
chased in 2006 with subprime mortgages have second mortgages,44
and many more homeowners have opened home equity lines of
credit secured by their home. The holder of the first mortgage will
generally not provide modifications simply to free up homeowner
resources to make payments on a formerly worthless junior lien or
to modify loans where there is a second mortgage in default be
cause the second mortgage-holder could force the home into
foreclosure. 45
40. See ROD DUBITSKY ET AL., CREDIT SUISSE FIXED INCOME RESEARCH, SUB.
PRIME LoAN MODIFICATIONS UPDATE 2 (200S) (noting that new monthly loan modifi
cations amount to only 3.S% of delinquent subprime loans, and even of these limited
modifications, a significant proportion actually increase the homeowner's monthly
payments).
41. See generally Larry Cordell et aI., The Incentives of Mortgage Servicers: Myths
and Realities (Fed. Reserve Bd. Working Paper 200S-46, 200S), http://www.federal
reserve.gov/Pubs/feds/200S/200846/revisionl200846pap.pdf.
42. See Vikas Bajaj & Barry Meier, Some Hedge Funds Argue Against Proposals
to Modify Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 200S, at BS.
43. See CREDIT SUISSE, THE DAY AfTER TOMORROW:. PAYMENT SHOCK AND
LOAN MODIFICATIONS (2007) (noting specific examples of PSAs with various modifica
tion restrictions, including five percent by balance, five percent by loan count, limits
on frequency, and limits on interest rate); see also Helping Families Save Their Homes:
The Role of Bankruptcy: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1l0th Cong.
(200S) (statement of Adam J. Levitin, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center),
available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/facultyllevitinldocuments!LevitinSenate
JudiciaryTestimony.pdf.
44. IVY L. ZELMAN ET AL., CREDIT SUISSE, MORTGAGE LIQUIDITY DU JOUR:
UNDERESTIMATED No MORE S (2007), http://billcara.comlCS%20Mar%2012%202007
%20Mortgage%20and %20Housing.pdf.
4S. As Credit Suisse reports, "it is often difficult, if not impossible, to force a
second-lien holder to take the pain prior to a first-lien holder when it comes to modifi
cations," which dooms the effort. ROD DUBITSKY ET AL., supra note 40, at S.
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Finally, there is the problem of perverse incentives and limited
servicer staff and technology.46 Although servicers are often not
paid for modifications, they are reimbursed for foreclosure costs.
Federal economists conclude, "loan loss mitigation is labor inten
sive and thus raises servicing costs, which in turn make it more
likely that a servicer would forego loss mitigation and pursue fore
closure even if the investor would be better off if foreclosure were
avoided. "47
Largely due to these structural impediments, only a small per
centage of failing loans have been modified. In October 2008,
Credit Suisse reported that only 3.5% of delinquent subprime loans
received modifications in August 2008. Of those modifications that
have occurred, many actually increased the borrower's monthly
payments by adding past-due payments onto the outstanding loan
balance. 48 A recent study of nearly four million subprime and alt-A
mortgages found that forty-five percent of modifications increased
the borrower's monthly payment. 49
Loan servicers' inability to overcome these impediments will
doom any proposed solution that relies solely on servicers' volun
tary agreement to modify loan terms. Any effective solution must
be capable of implementing an economically rational loan modifica
tion even where the servicer is unable to do so voluntarily. The
Obama Administration recently announced its plan to encourage
lenders and loan servicers to modify failing mortgages. 50 The Ad
ministration's plan marks a significant improvement over earlier at
tempts to encourage lenders and servicers to voluntarily modify
failing loans in that it addresses some of the major barriers to effec
tive modifications. Specifically, the plan offers servicers certain in
centive payments for modifications that meet particular
affordability measures, and rewards them further for each year (up
to three) that modification is sustained. This should counteract
some of the misaligned incentives that have made servicers reluc
tant to modify loans to date. Another provision that offers pay
ments to investors as well as servicers for qualifying loan
46.

Id. at 3, 9, 23.
Cordell, supra note 41, at 15.
ROD DUBITSKY ET AL., supra note 40, at 2.

47.
4S.
49. ALAN M. WHITE, DELEVERAGING AMERICAN HOMEOWNERS: DECEMBER IS,
200S UPDATE TO AUGUST 200S REPORT 2 (2OOS), http://www.hastingsgroup.coml
Whiteupdate.pdf.
50. See Making Home Affordable, http://www.financialstability.gov!roadtostabil
itylhomeowner.html (last visited May 15, 2009) (detailing the administration's plan).
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modifications made before an at-risk borrower has defaulted should
offset some servicer concerns about investor objections. 51 Indeed,
recently, the Chairman of the MBA, whose members include the
major servicers, has expressed the view that servicers will partici
pate. 52 However, as he also noted, in many cases servicers will re
main unwilling or unable to modify the mortgage. 53
In such cases, the most effective way to break the deadlock is
to empower a court to implement an economically rational solution
when the parties cannot do so on their own. 54 A court order would
resolve the servicers' fear of investor lawsuits because no liability
can arise from compliance with a court order. Moreover, it would
overcome servicers' misaligned financial incentives and lack of
qualified staff, and would solve the problem of junior lien holders,
whose cooperation can be compelled by the court. This is what
bankruptcy courts do every day, for all manner of debts, except for
mortgages on primary residences.
Currently, a loan on a family'S primary residence is the only
secured debt that cannot be restructured in a Chapter 13 bank
ruptcy payment plan. 55 The home mortgage exception dates to the
enactment of the current bankruptcy code in 1978, and was in
cluded in the Code as an advantage to mortgage lenders. At the
time, mortgage lending was a conservative business, and home
mortgages were nearly all fixed-interest-rate instruments with low
loan-to-value ratios. If a family ran into financial trouble, the home
mortgage itself was rarely the source of the distress. Moreover,
lenders held mortgages on their own books and so had the incentive
and ability to modify loans when appropriate.
51. See generally Ellen Harnick, Testimony before the House Committee on Fi
nancial Services, Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity, Examining
the Making Home Affordable Program (Mar. 19, 2009), http://www.house.gov/appsllistl
hearinglfinancialsvcs_dem!ltr031909.shtml.
52. See NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Public, Bankers, Analysts Debate Merits of
Obama's Foreclosure (PBS television broadcast Feb. 19, 2009), available at http://
www.pbs.orglnewshourlbblbusiness/jan-june09/foreclosures_02-19.html (broadcasting
statements by Mortgage Bankers Association President and CEO John Courson).
53. Id.
54. The administration's plan similarly calls for legislation to "allow judicial modi
fications of home mortgages during bankruptcy for borrowers who have run out of op
tions." Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Homeowner Affordability and
Stability Plan, Executive Summary (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.treasury.gov/press/
releases/tg33.htm.
55. The relevant provision is found at § 1322(b)(2) of the bankruptcy code, which
empowers the court to "modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a
claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal
residence, or of unsecured claims ...." 11 U.S.c. § 1322(b)(2) (2006).
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Whatever the merits of the exclusion in 1978, the mortgage
market has shifted considerably since then. In the current eco
nomic downturn, homeowners across the economic spectrum are
more vulnerable to foreclosure because fallen property values and
stressed credit markets limit the ability to sell or refinance homes.
If borrowers cannot restructure these debts, they will be forced into
foreclosure. Today, the home mortgage exception is contributing to
the downward economic spiral.56
There is clear precedent for eliminating the home mortgage ex
ception. Congress implemented a similar measure in response to
the farm crisis of the 1980s when an economic downturn and de
pressed land values were pushing family farmers into foreclosure.
Congress enacted the Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986,57 for
the specific and express purpose of permitting bankruptcy judges to
modify mortgages on family farms. The Act permitted adjustment
of interest rates, and the reduction of principal to fair market value
in order to help distressed farmers avoid foreclosure, including on
their primary residence. Chapter 12 proved effective in helping
farmers through the crisis. In fact, after being extended several
times, the Act was made a permanent part of the Bankruptcy Code
in 2005 with bipartisan support. 58
The current proposal provides protections for borrowers that
go beyond those of the Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act. 59 Interest
rates would be set at current market rates plus a reasonable risk
premium; the loan term could not exceed forty years (less the num
ber of years the borrower has already had the loan); and the princi
pal balance could not be reduced below the current fair market
56. See, e.g., Growing Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis, supra note 17 (statement of
Mark Zandi, Chief Economist and Cofounder, Moody's Economy.com) (discussing the
need for legislation to eliminate Chapter 13's primary-residence exception and noting
that "[t]here is no more efficacious way to short-circuit this developing cycle and fore
stall a severe recession than passing this legislation"). Lewis Ranieri, founder of Hype
rion Equity Funds and generally considered the father of the securitized residential
mortgage market, noted that allowing such relief is the only way to break through the
problem posed by second mortgages. In a recent speech, he said that for this reason,
even though he had advocated for the primary residence exception when the Bank
ruptcy Code was enacted in 1978, he "finally gave up" and now publicly supports per
mitting bankruptcy courts to modify mortgages on the primary residence. Lewis S.
Ranieri, Revolution in Mortgage Finance, Ninth Annual John T. Dunlop Lecture at the
Harvard Graduate School of Design (Oct. 1, 2008).
57. Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. AND 28 U.S.c.).
58. Family Farmer Bankruptcy Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-369, 118 Stat.
1749 (codified at 11 U.S.c. §§ 1201-1231 (2006».
59. Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986.
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value of the property. The solution would be available only where
the borrower is in imminent risk of foreclosure, and would provide
the mortgage-holder with as much as, or better than, what could be
obtained through a foreclosure sale.
Industry critics, particularly the MBA, have claimed that per
mitting bankruptcy courts to restructure primary residence mort
gages would increase lenders' costs and risks, and therefore
increase the cost of mortgage credit or make such credit less avail
able. 60 The Securities Industry Financial Markets Association and
the American Bankers Association have offered the same con
cern. 61 Academic and industry analysts have rejected this claim. In
fact, Professor Adam Levitin of Georgetown University, who ana
lyzed the data upon which the claim is based, concluded that, "there
is statistically a zero percent chance that the MBA's ... claim is
correct."62 Professor Levitin conducted an empirical study to test
the likely impact of the bankruptcy proposal on mortgage rates and
availability. First, he compared interest rates on mortgages that
currently can be restructured in bankruptcy-that is, mortgages on
investor properties, vacation homes, and on multi-family buildings
in which the owner occupies a unit-with the rates on primary resi
dence mortgages. After controlling for other risk factors, for exam
ple that mortgages on investor or vacation homes are considered
riskier for lenders because homeowners go to greater lengths to
hold onto the home they live in, he found that there is no increase
in interest rates or "risk premium" attributable to the availability of
bankruptcy modification. 63 He concluded, "there is unlikely to be
anything more than a de minimis effect on interest rates as a result
of permitting bankruptcy modification. "64
The same conclusion was reached by the Fixed Income Re
search team at Credit Suisse. Estimating that, "the bankruptcy plan
will provide about a 20% reduction in foreclosures," the report con
cluded, "we don't believe the bankruptcy reform will materially im

60. Mortgage Bankers Association, http://www.mbaa.org/default.htm (last visited
May 15, 2009).
61. American Bankers Association, http://www.aba.comldefault.htm (last visited
May 15, 2009); Securities Industry Financial Markets Association, http://www.sifma.org/
(last visited May 15, 2009).
62. He/ping Families Save Their Homes, supra note 43, at 16-17 (statement of
Adam J. Levitin).
63. Id. at 12-14.
64. Id. at 17.
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pact the pricing or availability of mortgage credit."65 Numerous
economists have recommended this solution, which is the only solu
tion under consideration that can address the intractable structural
impediments to significant foreclosure relief. With 46,000 families
losing their homes each week,66 it is to be hoped that the new ad
ministration and Congress will act quickly to implement this
relief. 67
CONCLUSION

Despite vast expenditures of taxpayer dollars, the current fi
nancial crisis will continue and the economy will not stabilize absent
strong measures to stem the tide of residential foreclosures. Mil
lions of current homeowners will lose their homes, and the down
ward spiral of declining home values, housing industry-related job
losses, and economic dislocation will not abate. While policymak
ers consider the options, foreclosures march on, week by week.
The time for decisive action is now. Such action must include a
mechanism for implementing economically rational modifications
of failing but recoverable loans when loan servicers are unwilling or
unable to do so themselves. While no solution is perfect, lifting the
ban on judicial loan foreclosures is an essential part of the solution.
It is the most cost-effective mechanism suggested to date, and
should be implemented without further delay. Over the longer
term, it is important to be clear about what did and what did not
cause the current crisis. Only then can appropriate regulatory
mechanisms be put into place to monitor and correct market
abuses, consumer protection lapses, and the misaligned market in
centives that produce them.
65. ROD DUBITSKY ET AL., CREDIT SUISSE, BANKRUPTCY LAW REFORM-A NEW
TOOL FOR FORECLOSURE AVOIDANCE 1, 13 (2009), http://capwiz.comlnacanetJ
attachments/Credi t_Suisse_Bankruptcy_Law_Reform. pdf.
66. The 46,000 figure is derived from the Mortgage Bankers Association's third
quarter 2008 National Delinquency Survey, which covers approximately eighty percent
of the market. Grossed up to reflect the entire market, the data yields a forecast of
2,432,900 foreclosures in 2009, which works out to 46,787 per week. See Ctr. for
Responsible Lending, Projected Foreclosures by State (2009), http://www.responsible
lending.orglmortgage-lendinglresearch-analysis/updated-foreclosure-and-spillover-brief
-8-18.pdf.
67. Bills to this effect, titled the "Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bank
ruptcy Act of 2009" have been introduced in both the House and Senate as Senate Bill
61 and House Bill 200. See S. 61, I11th Congo (2009), http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/
cgi-binlgetdoc.cgi?dbname=I11_cong....bills&docid=f:s61is.txt.pdf; H.R. 200, 111th
Congo (2009), http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong....
bills&docid=f:h200rh.txt.pdf.

